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INTRODUCTION 
As noted by several U.S. courts, the doctrine of equivalents has been 
“unworkable” for a number of years.1  However, as American courts 
move toward a more holistic approach to claim interpretation, the 
doctrine of equivalents will become unnecessary as a means of 
expanding patent scope.2  The holistic approach to claim interpretation 
involves a contextual reading of the patent claims that takes into 
account the definitions used throughout the patent document, including 
the specification and prosecution history.3  It places less emphasis on 
extrinsic sources, like dictionary definitions and treatises, and more 
emphasis on the patentee’s intent when he drafted his claims.  In this 
way, the holistic approach protects the intent of the patentee, while 
avoiding over-broad claim interpretation.4
U.S. courts have adopted the standard used by the House of Lords 
in the landmark claim interpretation case, Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst, 
whereby the House of Lords defines claim language as would a person 
reasonably “‘skilled in the art.’”5  This standard for claim interpretation 
is consistent with the holistic approach recently favored by the Federal 
Circuit in Phillips v. AWH, Corp., and will push U.S. patent law further 
toward abolishing the doctrine of equivalents as a means of expanding 
claim scope.6
Claims delimit a patentee’s intellectual property rights and notify the 
public of what information a patentee owns, so the claims and the way 
in which they are interpreted are very important in patent litigation.  
Some U.S. courts focus heavily on abstract dictionary definitions and 
other extrinsic sources in order to objectively interpret claim meaning.7  
1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 595 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (stating that the current approach to doctrine of equivalents law “has proven 
unworkable”).  See also, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 
(1997).  “We . . . share the concern . . . that the doctrine of equivalents . . . has taken on a life 
of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.”  Id. at 28-29. 
2. See MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(where the court did not use the doctrine of equivalents analysis, but instead used a more 
holistic approach to interpretation); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
3. See David Potashnik, Note, Phillips v. AWH:  Changing the Name of the Game, 39 
AKRON L. REV. 863, 876-878 (2006). 
4. See id. at 893. 
5. Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 1 All 
ER 667 (U.K.) (quoting § 72(1)(c) of the Patent Act of 1977). 
6. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303.  See also Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876, regarding the 
holistic approach to claim interpretation. 
7. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319; see e.g., Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
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Such abstract methods of claim interpretation lead to over-broad patent 
rights in some cases, and they also fail to account for the patentee’s 
intentions when he wrote the claims.8  The courts’ reliance on abstract 
extrinsic definitions in claim interpretation has meant that patentees did 
not always receive the protection they expected when they drafted their 
patent claims; this interpretive method has also made it difficult for 
third parties to determine what information falls within the claims’ 
scope.9  In short, abstract claim interpretation provides very little 
predictability for concerned parties who are seeking to predict their 
rights or to avoid infringement. 
Although abstract claim interpretation leads to unpredictable 
results, the results seem to be more objective, at least at first glance.10  
Dictionary definitions, treatises, and similar resources provide uniform 
definitions that are easy for most people to understand.  However, 
patentees often draft claims using terminology that has special meaning 
to them and to other members of their professions.  Dictionary 
definitions do not always adequately express what a patentee intended 
to convey, and this Comment will explore a new standard adopted by 
the Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH, Corp. that addresses this very 
issue.  This Comment will also discuss the similarities between the 
standard adopted in Phillips with the standard adopted by the House of 
Lords in the United Kingdom case, Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst, and its 
implications for U.S. doctrine of equivalents law. 
While extrinsic sources remain an important part of claim 
interpretation in the United States, the context of the claims (including 
intrinsic evidence of meaning, contained in the specification and 
prosecution history, and the inventor’s intent) should carry more weight 
in deciding the claims’ meanings.  Rather than relying too heavily on 
abstract, extrinsic sources, like dictionaries, U.S. courts are moving 
toward a standard similar to the one adopted by the House of Lords in 
1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
8. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“[I]f the district court starts with the broad dictionary 
definition in every case and fails to fully appreciate how the specification . . . limits that 
definition, the error will systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly 
expansive.”). 
9. See id. at 1319.  “[T]here may be a disconnect between the patentee’s responsibility 
to describe and claim his invention, and the dictionary editors’ objective of aggregating all 
possible definitions for particular words.”  Id. at 1321. 
10. “Dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises’ . . . are ‘objective resources that serve as 
reliable sources of information . . . .’”  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Texas Digital Sys., 
Inc., 308 F.3d at 1202). 
  
388  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 12:2 
 
 
Kirin-Amgen.11  If courts continue to move away from abstract extrinsic 
patent claim interpretation, the doctrine of equivalents will become less 
necessary to ensure the rights of patentees, and will eventually become 
obsolete. 
Adopting a “person reasonably skilled in the art,” or “person having 
ordinary skill in the art” approach to claim interpretation and 
eliminating the doctrine of equivalents in patent infringement cases 
would benefit patent law in several ways:  (1) when courts interpret 
patent claims from the perspective of a person reasonably skilled in the 
art, patentees would be better able to predict and control the scope of 
their intellectual property rights during patent prosecution;12 (2) when 
courts eliminate the doctrine of equivalents in conjunction with the 
reasonableness standard, patents would better fulfill their notice 
function, and others skilled in the art will be better able to determine 
the scope of prior patents;13 (3) when courts eliminate the doctrine of 
equivalents, competition would also improve because patentees will no 
longer receive protection for after-arising technologies, and other 
inventors will be better able to assess risk of infringement before they 
enter the market.14
I.  IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCTRINES IN KIRIN-AMGEN AND PHILLIPS 
A.  History of Claim Interpretation in the United States 
In the earliest days of patent litigation in the United States, patent 
claims did not even receive mention in the statute—patent attorneys 
began including claim-type language in patent specifications prior to the 
11. Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL 46. 
12. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1224-25 (2004); Roy Collins III, The 
Doctrine of Equivalents:  Rethinking the Balance Between Equity and Predictability, 22 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 285 (1992); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Essay, Innovation and the 
U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV 207, 234 (2006) (suggesting that the process of 
obtaining and protecting a patent might be less uncertain if the doctrine of equivalents were 
abolished). 
13. See Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1195 (“[The doctrine of equivalents] reverses course 
from the Court’s earlier history of assuring both notice to and fairness for the public.”); John 
Richards et al., Symposium, Panel I:  The End of Equivalents?  Examining the Fallout from 
Festo, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 727, 763  n.135 (2003) (“the greater 
the level of discretion left to the courts to look beyond the claim language . . . , the less the 
claims perform their public notice function . . . ,” citing the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
case Free World Trust v. Electro Santè, Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (Can.)). 
14. But see Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent 
Claim Scope:  A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005). 
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Patent Act of 1836 to more clearly define their clients’ inventions for the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).15  A line of cases 
following enactment of the 1836 Act, beginning with Merrill v. 
Yeomans, establishes the claims of the patent as the most important 
interpretive tool.16  “[T]he claims are ‘of primary importance, in the 
effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented.’”17  In order to 
provide the public with notice of what was protected in a given patent, 
claim interpretation based on the “plain meaning” of the words used, 
became the norm.  “[I]t is ‘unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of 
the law, to construe [the claim] in a manner different from the plain 
import of its terms.’”18  Earlier cases focused on the use of extrinsic 
evidence like dictionaries, treatises, and encyclopedias to find the literal, 
objective meanings of claim terms; but use of sources unconnected and 
unrelated to the patent led to abstract, and sometimes absurd, claim 
interpretations.19  Extrinsic interpretive tools are meant to provide 
consistency and objectivity in the process of claim interpretation, but 
they make it more difficult for those skilled in the art to determine how 
the court would interpret the patentee’s specialized language.20  Rather 
than relying on their own knowledge of such language, third parties 
have to attempt to predict which extrinsic sources courts will use, and 
then to determine which of the definitions held in those sources will be 
chosen.  This system makes it very difficult to determine how patent 
claims will be interpreted, and how to avoid infringing those claims. 
15. Id. at 1961.  “Claims were not mentioned in the Patent Act of 1793; they first 
appear in the 1836 Act.  Prior to the 1836 Act, however, patent attorneys . . . began to include 
claim-type language in the patent specification.”  Potashnik, supra note 3, at 869 (quoting R. 
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA.L.REV. 1105, 1120 (2004)).  “Patent claims, as 
we currently understand them, ‘did not exist until the early 1800s, did not receive formal legal 
recognition until 1836, and were not required of all patentees until 1870.’”  Id. 
16. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876). 
17. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570). 
18. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886)). 
19. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (“‘Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in 
dictionaries can often produce absurd results.’”) (quoting Liebscher v. Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 
948, 951 (C.C.P.A. 1958)).  See also Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1321 (2004) (“a general-usage dictionary cannot overcome credible 
art-specific evidence of the meaning or lack of meaning of a claim term”). 
20. Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 179, 201 (2007) (“The difficulty is that the parties usually do not know in advance 
which words the court will eventually construe narrowly.”) (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001), in which “[t]he result . . . was a patent 
interpreted far more broadly than what the patentee actually described.”).  Id. at 202. 
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In most recent claim interpretation cases, courts have looked instead 
to intrinsic information first, including the specification and prosecution 
history, which have been resurrected from the “secondary role” in 
which they were placed after Graver Tank.21  Using intrinsic interpretive 
tools leads to less abstract, and often narrower, claim interpretation.22  
Narrower claim interpretations work to the detriment of patentees in 
the sense that they will not receive such broad protection against 
infringement, but this intrinsic approach provides everyone involved 
with a higher level of predictability as to what information is 
encompassed by a particular claim.23  This should aid patentees in 
drafting claims and should also help third parties to better avoid 
infringement. 
Phillips v. AWH, Corp. suggests that U.S. courts should use a 
“person of ordinary skill in the art” standard, in which the court will 
interpret claims, in light of intrinsic evidence, from the perspective of a 
reasonable person skilled in the relevant art.24  This modern standard is 
practically identical to the standard adopted by the House of Lords in 
21. Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1966-67 (“The role of the patent claim . . . had 
become increasingly important by the time Graver Tank was decided. . . .  The specification 
remained an important interpretive guide, but it was relegated to a secondary role . . . .”).  See 
also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1950) (“We have 
held . . . that th[e] statute precludes invoking the specifications to alter a claim . . . , since ‘it is 
the claim which measures the grant to the patentee’”).  For an example of a recent case in 
which the court returns to the specification as an interpretive tool, see Phillips, 415 F.3d at 
1313 (the Federal Circuit stated that “the court starts the decision making process by 
reviewing the . . . patent specification and the prosecution history,” indicating the 
specification’s gain in importance) (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
22. Potashnik, supra note 3, at 882 (“If courts focus on the . . . language of the 
specification, the patent claims . . . will be construed narrowly . . .”). 
23. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their 
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 55-56 (2005) (describing the way in 
which narrow claim interpretation results in narrower patent scope, which decreases the 
likelihood of a finding of infringement).  See also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (stating that 
patent scope will be more predictable when the terms contained in the patent are interpreted 
not using extrinsic sources like dictionaries, but rather using a reasonable person skilled in the 
art test).  But see R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2004) 
(“Notwithstanding the fact that the procedural/holistic dichotomy does not map precisely 
onto a broad/narrow distinction, . . . the choice of a procedural methodological approach will, 
over the long run, yield . . . more predictable (and perhaps broader) claim constructions. . . 
.”).  Wagner and Petherbridge argue that the use of extrinsic sources can lead to greater 
predictability in the long term. 
24. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (“The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the 
art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim 
interpretation.”). 
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Kirin-Amgen, except that in Kirin-Amgen, the House of Lords treated 
the person reasonably skilled in the art standard as a substitute for any 
doctrine of equivalents or similar claim-broadening device.25
Prior to Phillips, in which the court attempts to clarify the 
importance of intrinsic versus extrinsic interpretive tools, conflict 
existed between the two methods of claim interpretation described 
above, and Phillips attempts to resolve this conflict.26  The two 
conflicting canons of claim construction were as follows:  “(a) that 
claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification or prosecution 
history, and (b) that claims may not be modified beyond their actual 
language by reference to the specification or prosecution history.”27  The 
two methods were polarized, and there was little certainty or 
consistency with respect to which standard the court would choose in a 
particular case.28  This inconsistency hindered the notice function of 
patent claims and was a source of confusion for inventors trying to draft 
patent claims that would best protect their work.  Under the standards 
used in either Kirin-Amgen or Phillips, the first canon receives 
precedence over the second, thus eliminating any tension between them.  
This canon of construction is consistent with the holistic approach to 
claim interpretation, and is also consistent with interpreting patent 
claims from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art, 
as it looks to the language used in the patent itself in order to interpret 
the claims. 
The two canons of claim construction described above have become 
associated with two parallel approaches to claim interpretation.29  The 
25. Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL at ¶ 43 (“The solution . . . [is] to adopt a principle of 
construction which actually g[ives] effect to what the person skilled in the art would have 
understood the patentee to be claiming.”). 
26. See Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303.  See also, Potashnik, supra note 3, at 872-73 (“After 
Markman, a number of canons largely governed claim construction. . . .  However, . . .many . . 
.of these canons are contradictory . . . .”). 
27. Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876. 
28. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1161-62 (graphically depicting the 
lack of predictability among Federal Circuit judges with respect to the chosen methodology 
for interpreting patent claims).  See also Cotropia, supra note 23, at 93 (calling for more 
consistency with respect to the methodology used by courts in interpreting patent claims); 
Potashnik, supra note 3, at 872 (“Practitioners have complained that these contradictions 
make ‘it difficult to provide your client clear guidance in terms of what their patent claims 
actually mean.’”) (quoting Christine Hines, A Defining Moment for Patent Law:  Court Mulls 
the Best Way to Interpret Patent Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004.) 
29. See Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876-77.  “[R]esolution of these canons ultimately 
resulted in two distinct claim construction approaches:  the ‘holistic’ approach and the 
‘procedural’ approach.”  Id. at 876.  See also Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim 
Construction, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 61, 105-06 (2006).  “Many of the canons of claim construction 
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two approaches have come to be known as (1) the holistic approach, in 
which “claim terms must be read in view of the patent specification of 
which they are a part,”30 and (2) the procedural approach, in which the 
“‘ordinarily understood meaning of the claim language’” is “‘ascertained 
from dictionaries and encyclopedias.’”31  The holistic approach “‘moves 
away from the abstract “ordinary meaning” of a term in favor of . . . ’” a 
narrower reading of the patent’s scope.32  Conversely, the procedural 
approach results in a much broader interpretation of claims, less 
tailored to the four corners of the patent.33  While patentees may favor 
the procedural approach when it gives them broader rights, the 
approach is less than ideal for third parties and results in less 
predictability for all parties, including the patentee seeking patent rights 
and protection.34  For other inventors skilled in the art who wish to 
determine whether they will infringe a patent under the procedural 
interpretation method, they must read the patent claims in light of their 
“ordinary meaning” as found in a dictionary.35  This means they must 
determine what the claims mean by researching dictionary definitions, 
treatises, encyclopedias, and the like, rather than simply drawing on 
their own expertise.  Add to this the complication of guessing which 
method or extrinsic source a particular court will use in a given case and 
the situation can become frustrating, particularly for third parties trying 
not to infringe.36
not only can be used in conjunction with the linguistic-based methodology”—analogous to 
the procedural approach referred to in this Note—“but in fact, some of them even bolster the 
validity of the process.”  Id. at 105.  One of the canons Osenga refers to as bolstering her 
approach to claim construction is that of interpreting the claims as narrowly as possible in 
conjunction with the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the word.  Id. at 107. 
30. Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876. 
31. Id. at 876-77 (quoting David J.F. Gross & Theodore M. Budd, “We Have a Split 
Decision”:  Analyzing the Internal Conflicts Within the Federal Circuit on the Issue of Claim 
Construction, 804 PRACTISING L. INST./PAT. LITIG. 55, 62 (2004)). 
32. Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876 (quoting Gross & Budd, supra note 31, at 61). 
33. See id. 
34. But see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1142. 
35. See, e.g., Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (in which the court 
states that a dictionary is sufficient to determine the ordinary meaning of claim terms that are 
not terms of art); One World Techs., Ltd. v. Rexon Indus. Corp., 2006 WL 1155951, *4 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006).  “[T]he claim terms must be construed in light of their ordinary meaning, with the 
dictionary serving as one tool ‘that can assist the court in determining the meaning of 
particular terminology to those of skill in the art . . . .’”  Id. at n.6 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d 
1303).  Although, the court also points out that extrinsic sources should only be used after 
appraisal of information intrinsic to the patent specification).  Id. at *4.  See also Osenga, 
supra note 29. 
36. Id.  See also, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321-22 (quoting Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. 
v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227 (1880)). 
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When courts use the holistic approach, third parties skilled in the 
relevant art receive better notice of what material is protected by the 
patent claims because they can simply read and interpret the patent 
based on their own knowledge of the art and based on materials 
available to themselves and the patentee.  While the holistic approach 
generally leads to narrower claim interpretations, and is thus favorable 
to third parties and other inventors in the sense that they will still have 
access to the information excluded from the patentee’s bundle of IP 
rights, it does provide some protection to the patentee as well.  Just as 
others skilled in the art may read the patent claims according to their 
knowledge and expertise, patentees may draft the claims according to 
their knowledge and expertise, eliminating difficulties that may arise for 
them when they try to draft their claims in a way that is more consistent 
with extrinsic sources of information.  Claim drafting is arguably more 
difficult when courts take this approach to interpreting claims because 
there is no objective way of determining how the court will interpret the 
claims, but this approach allows courts to interpret claims in a way that 
is less rigid and potentially more consistent with the way another skilled 
in the relevant art might interpret them.37  The holistic approach is 
meant to give effect to the true intent of the patentee at the time the 
patent was drafted and also allows the courts some flexibility in their 
interpretations of patent claims.38
[I]t is inevitable that the multiple dictionary definitions for a term will extend 
beyond the “construction of the patent [that] is confirmed by the avowed 
understanding of the patentee . . . when his application for the original patent was 
pending.”  . . . Thus, the use of the dictionary may extend patent protection beyond 
what should properly be afforded . . . . 
Id. 
37. But see Crissa A. Seymour Cook, Comment, Constructive Criticism:  Phillips v. 
AWH Corp. and the Continuing Ambiguity of Patent Claim Construction Principles, 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 225, 261 (2006). 
[T]he ‘holistic approach’ . . . promotes neither innovation nor certainty.  With no set 
standard, inventors and patent attorneys . . . will spend considerable time drafting 
patent documents in anticipation of the different judges they may encounter . . . .  
They must attempt to draft documents in such a way that everyone imaginable 
clearly understands what is being claimed. 
Id.  See also Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc:  Toward a More 
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 153, 170 (2004).  
Formalism—as in the procedural approach—“promotes patentees’ ability to plan and . . . to 
gravitate toward a more uniform dictionary-oriented set of draft language.”  Id.  “The 
hallmark of formalism is its predictability . . . , which also opens it to the criticism of being 
wooden and mechanical.”  Id. 
38. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1142 (“[T]he holistic approach, by 
offering substantially greater flexibility, allows more opportunities for judges to tailor claim 
construction analyses according to other critical issues in the case, such as infringement or 
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The conflict between the two approaches to claim interpretation 
bears on the doctrine of equivalents because the doctrine of equivalents 
extends patent rights where claims are written or construed too 
narrowly to provide literal protection to the patentee.  Where dictionary 
definitions used in the procedural approach to claim interpretation 
prove inadequate to describe the patentee’s intentions, or where the 
holistic approach falls short because the patentee did not draft his 
claims broadly enough, patentees turn to the doctrine of equivalents to 
protect against infringement retroactively.  For reasons discussed below, 
the doctrine of equivalents leads to more and different problems, 
particularly for those who wish to compete with the patented device.39  
Where the doctrine of equivalents has become an “unworkable” system 
due to its tendency to create over-broad patent rights and unpredictable 
results,40 the holistic approach to claims interpretation as described in 
Phillips offers a workable system, in which patentees receive the patent 
rights they intended to claim, competitors have a clearer idea of what is 
protected under the patent, and the doctrine of equivalents is not 
necessary. 
B.  The Development of Problems with the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents arose from a desire to treat patentees 
fairly when the literal language of their claims failed to adequately 
capture the scope of their inventions.41  Unfortunately, introduction of 
the doctrine of equivalents created the same ambiguity in claim 
interpretation that courts tried to avoid in espousing abstract claim 
validity.”).  See also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-15. 
39. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 576 (“‘[T]he doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, 
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming 
requirement.’”) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 
(1997)).  See generally Allan G. Altera, Expanding the Reissue Procedure:  A Better Way to 
Do Business, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 186 (1993), Quillen, supra note 12, at 234, and 
Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1157 (describing the problems associated with the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
40. See supra note 39. 
41. See Erin Conway, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC:  Is There “Some Other Reason” 
for Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1655, 1677 (2007) 
(“[T]he foundation of the doctrine of equivalents lies in the idea that limiting a patent claim’s 
scope to its literal interpretation offers little protection to the patentee.”) (citing Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722 (No. 00-1543), 2001 WL 1025650).  
See also Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cir. 1948) 
(“[A] boundary cannot be drawn with precision; and the draftsman of claims is always in 
something of a dilemma . . . which has led to the . . . ‘doctrine of equivalents’ . . . .”). 
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interpretation (the procedural approach discussed above).42  The 
doctrine of equivalents allows broader patent scope to patentees, but it 
has “taken on a life of its own,”43 depriving the public of the notice 
function claims were originally intended to serve and making it almost 
impossible to predict exactly what will infringe existing patents.44  
Additionally, the doctrine of equivalents hinders competition by 
granting rights to patentees in after-arising technologies and other 
intellectual property that could not possibly have been included in the 
original claim language.45  In such cases, new technology arises that is 
similar to, or in some cases based on, existing technology that has 
already been patented.  The existing patent-holder may then claim that 
the new technology is so similar to his already-patented product that it 
effectively infringes his patent.  In this way, the doctrine of equivalents 
suppresses new technology, and competitors are dissuaded from 
entering the market for fear that their inventions will infringe existing 
patents under the doctrine of equivalents.46
In order to remedy the murky situation surrounding the modern 
doctrine of equivalents, many have suggested eliminating, or at least 
overhauling, the doctrine and starting from scratch.47  In the United 
Kingdom, the House of Lords has determined that the costs of the 
doctrine of equivalents (and similar interpretive tools) outweigh the 
benefits.48  In Kirin-Amgen, the House of Lords determined that in 
order to avoid the situation U.S. courts face with the doctrine of 
42. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21 (“[T]he doctrine [of equivalents] is not free 
from confusion.”).  See generally Collins, supra note 12, at 294, 300 (describing the lack of 
predictability and consistency in application of the doctrine). 
43. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents, as it has come 
to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent 
claims.”). 
44. Id. 
45. See Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1194-95.  “[T]he expanded and uncertain scope of 
patent protection results in reduced levels of competition, which results in higher prices . . 
.and fewer beneficial alternatives . . . .”  Id. at 1198.  But see Meurer & Nard, supra note 14 at 
1954-55 (“Although critics of the [doctrine of equivalents] contend that the doctrine unduly 
inhibits competition, surprisingly, we show that often the degree of competition is unaffected 
by the presence or absence of the [doctrine of equivalents].”). 
46. See Altera, supra note 39, at 197 (explaining why the patent reissue procedure is a 
better way to “promote the useful arts”); Quillen, supra note 12, at 234-35, n.84 (describing 
some of the difficulties to innovators who must defend against doctrine of equivalents 
claims); Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1157 (“The modern doctrine of equivalents lacks 
theoretical justification, imposes high costs on society, and likely impedes innovation.”). 
47. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21 (“Petitioner . . . invites us to speak the death 
of [the doctrine of equivalents] . . . .”).  See also supra note 46. 
48. See Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL 46. 
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equivalents it would devise a new approach to claim interpretation.49  
The justices reasoned that the doctrine of equivalents is only necessary 
where courts use literal claim interpretation to define patent scope (akin 
to our procedural approach),50 so they devised a reasonableness 
standard to replace literal claim interpretation, which is very similar to 
the holistic approach adopted by the Federal Circuit in Phillips.51  Their 
“reasonable person” is defined as a “reasonable person skilled in the 
art” (emphasis added) (analogous to the “person of ordinary skill in the 
art” in Phillips),52 and each claim is to be interpreted in the context of 
the entire patent document, defined in the way a reasonable person 
skilled in the art would define the claim.53  This approach parallels the 
first canon of construction described above,54 which is the focus of the 
holistic approach to claim interpretation, whereby the court must look 
to the language used in the patent itself (e.g., the specification and 
prosecution history) to fully and accurately interpret the claims.55  The 
House of Lords intended for the new standard both to provide 
patentees with some predictability as to what the scope of their patents 
49. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43. 
It seems . . . that both the doctrine of equivalents in the United States and the pith 
and marrow doctrine in the United Kingdom were born of despair. . . . The solution 
. . . [is] to adopt a principle of construction which actually g[ives] effect to what the 
person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to be claiming. 
Id. 
50. Id. at ¶ 42. 
If literalism stands in the way of construing patent claims so as to give fair protection 
to the patentee, there are two things that you can do.  One is to adhere to literalism 
in construing the claims and evolve a doctrine which supplements the claims by 
extending protection to equivalents.  That is what the Americans have done.  The 
other is to abandon literalism. 
Id. 
51. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43. 
52. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶ 48. 
53. Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶ 47. 
What principle of interpretation would give fair protection to the patentee?  Surely, 
a principle which would give him the full extent of the monopoly which the person 
skilled in the art would think he was intending to claim.  And what principle would 
provide a reasonable degree of protection for third parties?  Surely again, a 
principle which would not give the patentee more than the full extent of the 
monopoly which the person skilled in the art would think that he was intending to 
claim. 
Id. 
54. See supra Part I.A. for a description of this canon of construction. 
55. See generally Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23 (describing at length the 
holistic and procedural approaches to claim interpretation); Potashnik, supra note 3, at 876-78 
(defining the holistic approach). 
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will be and to provide the public and others skilled in the relevant art 
with notice of what information the patent actually protects.56
The doctrine of equivalents arose out of a desire to treat patentees 
fairly.57  Courts believed that “inventor[s] deserve[d] a property right in 
[their] invention[s]” and that infringers should not benefit from overly 
narrow claim interpretation.58  U.S. courts created the doctrine of 
equivalents when they decided the case Winans v. Denmead.59  In 
Winans, “the majority was . . . concerned with the fair treatment of the 
inventor and punishing the putative unscrupulous behavior of the 
infringer.”60  However, the dissent in Winans expressed concern that the 
social costs of the broad patent scope created by the doctrine of 
equivalents would outweigh any benefits.61  Nearly a century later, in 
Graver Tank, the debate continued, as the Court delivered another split 
opinion upholding the doctrine of equivalents, but in which the dissent 
cited its social costs.62
In more recent U.S. cases, courts used the doctrine of equivalents to 
protect patentees’ intellectual property rights in the event of drafting 
errors,63 in the event language proved inadequate to capture their 
56. Id.  See also  Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶¶ 71-72 (stating that a 
procedural approach to claim interpretation provides no more certainty than does the 
“reasonable person skilled in the art” standard outlined in this case). 
57. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1959 (In describing the first significant U.S. 
doctrine of equivalents case, Winans v. Denmead, the authors state that “the majority was . . . 
concerned with the fair treatment of the inventor . . . .”).  See also supra notes 41 and 53. 
58. Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1956. 
59. Id. at 1959. 
60. Id.  See also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 329, 342-43 (1853) (where the Court 
describes its rationale for protecting patents under the doctrine of equivalents). 
61. Winans, 56 U.S. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (“Nothing, in the administration 
of this law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of 
exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a 
relaxation of [the] . . . requisitions of the act of Congress [by espousing a doctrine of 
equivalents].”).   See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1959 (“[T]he dissent in Winans 
was uneasy about the social costs of broad patent scope . . . .”). 
62. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[I]t is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe [the claim] in a 
manner different from the plain import of its terms.’”) (citing White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 
52 (1886)); Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1967 (describing the significance of Graver 
Tank in the development of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence). 
63. See, e.g., In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (where a patent attorney 
is called upon during an infringement action to explain why certain information was left out 
of the claims during the drafting process).  See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1968-69 
n.107 (describing the friction theory justification for the doctrine of equivalents, whereby the 
doctrine protects the scope of a patentee’s rights despite difficulties that arose during the 
drafting stage, among other stages, of the process of writing the patent) (citing Martin J. 
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ideas,64 or in the event that they were simply unable to foresee an after-
arising equivalent.65
On the other hand, recent United Kingdom cases have moved away 
from any doctrine of equivalents or similar interpretive tool, instead 
espousing a new approach to claim interpretation that renders the 
doctrine of equivalents unnecessary.66  Rather than focus on the literal 
meaning of the words in the claims, the House of Lords, in cases like 
Kirin-Amgen, chose to focus instead on the meaning of the words to a 
person reasonably skilled in the art.67  In conjunction with this new 
interpretation standard, U.K. courts have ceased using the doctrine of 
equivalents to supplement claim interpretation in order to avoid the 
unpredictability and other social costs associated with broader claim 
interpretation.68  They argue that their new interpretive standard 
eliminates the need for a claim-broadening device like the doctrine of 
equivalents because it puts the focus on the patentee’s intent when he 
drafted the patent claims.69  This should enable the patentee to draft 
Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:  Questions that 
Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 711 (1989) (“Most frequently, patent 
holders use the doctrine of equivalents to rectify . . . a ‘mistake’ in the process of drafting . . . 
the application . . . .  The patent holder argues that the failure to include something in the 
claim was an oversight.”)). 
64. See, e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 622 (“In addition to the inexact fit caused by the 
inherent limitations of language, the language itself may not be adequately developed at the 
early stages when patent applications . . . are filed . . . .”); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United 
States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Often the invention is novel and words do not exist 
to describe it.”); see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1969-70 (citing both of the above 
cases and describing the “Limitations of Language” justification for the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
65. See e.g., Festo, 234 F.3d at 619 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents accommodates [an] 
unforeseeable dilemma for claim drafters.”); Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37 (where the 
Court recognizes the validity of application of the doctrine of equivalents to include after-
arising technologies in a patent claim); see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1970 
(“[P]atent prosecutors are not expected to claim unforeseeable equivalents.”).  But see Sage 
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is the patentee 
who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for [a] foreseeable alteration of [the] 
claimed structure.”). 
66. See, e.g., Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶¶ 37-42 (stating that it is better to 
find a new way of interpreting claims than to continue to broaden them using the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
67. Id. at ¶ 41. 
68. Id. at ¶ 39 (“[O]nce the monopoly ha[s] been allowed to escape from the terms of 
the claims, it is not easy to know where its limits should be drawn.”).  See LB Europe Ltd. v. 
Smurfit Bag in Box SA, [2007] EWHC 510, ¶¶ 51-52, for an example of a recent UK case in 
which the principles of claim construction laid out in Kirin-Amgen were followed. 
69. See Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶ 30. 
[T]he author of a . . . patent specification is using language to make a 
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better claims, and it should also enable all concerned parties to better 
predict what the scope of the claims will be before they even reach a 
court.  With U.S. cases like Phillips that address claim interpretation by 
adopting the same “reasonable person skilled in the art” standard 
created by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen, U.S. courts have taken a 
step toward abolishing the doctrine of equivalents.70
II.  THE CASES 
A.  Phillips v. AWH, Corp. 
In Phillips v. AWH, Corp., Edward Phillips, inventor of a security 
wall design used in prisons, accused AWH, Corp., along with several 
other defendant companies, of using his patented design after their 
license agreement had expired.71  Phillips’s invention was a fire-resistant 
and bulletproof wall to be used mainly in prisons, but also in other 
facilities where such security measures might be necessary.72  AWH, 
Corp.—which had contracted with Phillips to use his wall design for a 
number of years—continued to use a wall with interior baffles, much 
like the one Phillips developed, after their license agreement expired.73  
The question of whether AWH’s design infringed Phillips’s patent 
centered on the angle of the baffles within the walls.74  AWH used walls 
with ninety-degree baffles, while Phillips’s patent claims only described 
baffles at angles other than ninety degrees.75
In the process of interpreting Phillips’s patent claims, the court 
analyzed the merits of using extrinsic, as opposed to intrinsic, sources in 
order to define the terms of the claims.76  The court concluded that 
intrinsic sources (i.e., the specification and prosecution history) take 
precedence over extrinsic sources, contradicting some prior case law 
that relied more heavily on things like dictionary definitions.77  By 
communication for a practical purpose and that a rule of construction which gives 
his language a meaning different from the way it would have been understood by 
the people to whom it was actually addressed is liable to defeat his intentions. 
Id. 
70. See, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. 
71. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1310. 
75. Id. 
76. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-23. 
77. Id. at 1320-24 (specifically, the court addresses the assertion of the court in Texas 
Digital Systems that there should be a presumption in favor of interpreting a word according 
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placing such a high level of importance on intrinsic over extrinsic 
sources, the court effectively adopted the holistic approach to claim 
interpretation (and the first canon of claim construction listed above) as 
the preferred interpretive method for the Federal Circuit.  The court in 
Phillips insisted that the specification and prosecution history offered 
the best explanations of the claim terms in light of the patentee’s 
intentions, and in light of the way in which “a person of ordinary skill in 
the art” would interpret them.78
The court not only emphasized the importance of intrinsic sources of 
information as interpretive tools, but also developed a standard by 
which courts should interpret the words of the patent.79  According to 
Phillips, courts should interpret claim language as would a person of 
ordinary skill in the art.80  By defining this as the standard for claim 
interpretation, the court did two things:  (1) it created a standard 
objective enough that it can be applied consistently and provide notice 
to other inventors, thus encouraging and fostering competition; and (2) 
it provided a fair interpretation standard for patentees that will allow 
them to draft patent claims using familiar language.81
Although the doctrine of equivalents was not at issue in this case, 
and was not directly addressed by the court, the court made clear that it 
wishes to prevent the kind of over-broad claim interpretation that often 
results when the doctrine of equivalents comes into play.82  While some 
fear that emphasis on intrinsic materials in claim interpretation will 
generally lead to narrower patent rights, the focus on intrinsic 
to its dictionary definition and that extrinsic sources are the primary tool of claim 
interpretation, supplemented by intrinsic sources like the specification). 
78. Id. at 1313. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (quoting Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)) (“‘customary meaning’ refers to the ‘customary meaning in [the] art field’”).  
“[P]atents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of skill in the pertinent art.”  
Id. 
81. Id.  “The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim 
term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.”  Id.  But see 
Cotropia, supra note 23, at 118-20 (describing the ways in which use of intrinsic sources lead 
to more competition, but narrower patent rights); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 
1112-13 (stating that the procedural approach to claim interpretation is more predictable than 
the holistic approach). 
82. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“The risk of systematic overbreadth is greatly reduced if 
the court instead focuses at the outset on how the patentee used the claim term in the claims, 
specification, and prosecution history, rather than starting with a broad definition . . . .”). 
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information in this case lead to a finding of infringement on the part of 
AWH, Corp.83
B.  Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst, Inc. 
In Kirin-Amgen, the House of Lords directly addressed the issue of 
whether there should be a doctrine of equivalents in U.K. patent law.84  
The case centered around two different methods of producing the 
protein erythropoietin (EPO) using recombinant DNA technologies.85  
Amgen produced the protein using exogenous genetic material, or 
material from outside the host cell, while Hoechst used endogenous 
genetic material with an exogenous promoter sequence.86  This means 
that the promoter sequence used by Hoechst consisted of material from 
outside the cell and was meant to induce the cell to use its own EPO 
gene sequence to produce more of the desired protein.  The House of 
Lords ultimately concluded that there was no infringement because the 
patent was invalid (due to over breadth and lack of novelty), but in 
drawing this conclusion, the justices analyzed the role of the doctrine of 
equivalents in interpreting patent claims.87
Hoechst’s technology did not literally infringe the claims of Amgen’s 
patent.88  However, Amgen argued the House of Lords should find 
infringement anyway because a reasonable person skilled in the art 
would have understood their claims to include Hoechst’s method.89  
While the House of Lords disagreed with the conclusion of 
infringement, they embraced the “reasonable person skilled in the art 
standard.”90  The House of Lords ruled that the claims should be 
interpreted with their audience in mind.91  The audience to whom the 
claims are addressed is part of the context of the claims, and the claims 
should be interpreted as this audience would likely interpret them, 
based on its knowledge of the particular field involved.  The justices 
suggested that this standard would eliminate the need for a doctrine of 
83. Id. at 1328.  See Cotropia, supra note 23, at 119 (describing the way in which use of 
intrinsic sources to interpret patent claims fosters competition at the same time that it leads to 
narrow interpretation of claims); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1113 (“[E]vidence 
suggests that the procedural approach is inherently more consistent than holistic analyses.”). 
84. Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶ 36. 
85. Id. at ¶¶ 8-11. 
86. Id. at ¶ 11. 
87. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 132. 
88. Id. 
89. Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL 46 at ¶ 17. 
90. See id. at ¶¶ 41-42. 
91. Id. at ¶ 41. 
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equivalents because the knowledge and experience of those skilled in 
the art should encompass any equivalent technologies already in 
existence.92  This means the standard would not encompass after-arising 
technologies. 
In creating such a standard and finding no doctrine of equivalents, 
this opinion, like Phillips, does two things:  (1) provides an objective 
standard that will give the patentee and other inventors notice and some 
degree of predictability with respect to result; and (2) allows patentees 
to draft claims using common sense and language with which they are 
familiar.93  The court’s standard accomplishes these goals by providing a 
rule that is specially catered to those who will be reading the claims.  
Under this standard, persons skilled in the relevant art may rely on their 
knowledge in order to determine whether they will infringe existing 
patents, rather than attempting to understand complex rules of 
construction or dictionary definitions that might differ from their own 
understanding of the material.  It will allow persons skilled in the 
relevant art to predict what materials the court will use to interpret 
existing patent claims (generally, materials intrinsic to the patent, such 
as the specification), and it will help them know the limits of a patent so 
they can avoid infringement. 
By tailoring its interpretation toward those skilled in the art, the 
House of Lords’ decision also protects patentees.  Patentees are 
members of the category, “persons skilled in the relevant art.”  They 
may also use their knowledge of the art to more skillfully construct 
claims and to better understand the limits of their patents.  While this 
standard will often lead to narrower claim interpretations than the 
doctrine of equivalents would allow, patentees and third parties alike 
should have a better idea of what material is protected by the claims, 
what material is still available for use by all, and how to better draft 
patent claims to encompass all relevant material. 
 
III.  SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PHILLIPS AND KIRIN-AMGEN AND 
BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
A.  Similarities between the Cases 
The standards used by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen and the 
Federal Circuit in Phillips are strikingly similar.  Both rely on the 
92. Id. at ¶ 49. 
93. Id. at ¶¶ 36-44. 
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perspective of “persons reasonably skilled in the art” (or the “person 
having ordinary skill in the art”) in order to create a more objective, 
reliable, and fair way of interpreting patent claims.94  Although the cases 
occur on different continents, and although Phillips does not directly 
address the doctrine of equivalents, the concerns addressed by each case 
are also strikingly similar.  Both seek to provide clarity for patentees 
and others skilled in the art by developing a standard by which patent 
claims may be interpreted—and they offer this clarity in almost the 
same way.95
In Kirin-Amgen, the “reasonable person skilled in the art” standard 
allowed the House of Lords to derive fair results when interpreting 
patent claims.  For them, the standard struck a balance between the 
property rights of the patentee and the need to provide third parties 
with adequate notice.96  The justices in Kirin-Amgen determined that 
this standard eliminated the need for a doctrine of equivalents because 
it adequately protected the patentee’s interests.97  The court in Phillips 
did not go so far as to state that the “person having ordinary skill in the 
art” standard would eliminate the need for an American doctrine of 
equivalents, but, in effect, it does just that.  By adopting essentially the 
same standard used by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen for claim 
interpretation, the court in Phillips created a way to balance the 
interests of patentees and third parties while ensuring that the patent 
rights granted would not be too broad. 
B.  Benefits of Eliminating the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Eliminating the doctrine of equivalents will benefit patent law in 
several ways:  (1) it will enhance competition by creating greater 
predictability for inventors seeking to enter the market as to whether 
they will infringe prior art;98 (2) it will provide better notice to the public 
94. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL at ¶ 43. 
95. Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303; Kirin-Amgen, Inc., [2004] UKHL 46. 
96. Kirin-Amgen, Inc,, [2004] UKHL at ¶¶ 30, 33. 
[A] rule of construction which gives [a patentee’s] language a meaning different 
from the way it would have been understood by the people to whom it was actually 
addressed is liable to defeat his intentions. . . .  [Another inventor] reads the 
specification on the assumption that its purpose is both to describe and to demarcate 
an invention . . . and not to be a textbook . . . .” 
Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See generally Quillen, supra note 12, at 210 (describing the way in which narrower, 
more predictable patent claim interpretation will foster innovation); Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 
1198 (“[T]he expanded and uncertain scope of patent protection results in reduced levels of 
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and to others skilled in the art of what information patents cover;99 and 
(3) it will create more consistency in court opinions because courts will 
use a more reliable standard.100
The doctrine of equivalents allows courts to expand patent rights 
beyond the scope of the claim language where the infringing technology 
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
for the same purpose” as the original invention.101  The doctrine is 
ambiguous in that there is no objective way of determining when 
something is similar enough to an existing invention to warrant 
expanded protection, and there is no way of determining exactly how far 
to extend a patentee’s rights.  The ambiguity makes it almost impossible 
for competitors to predict when their inventions will infringe prior art as 
after-arising technologies.  This uncertainty discourages innovation and 
makes it less likely that competing inventors will invest in improving or 
expanding existing products.102  This disadvantage would be eliminated 
if courts abandoned the doctrine of equivalents for a more objective 
standard like the one articulated above in Kirin-Amgen and Phillips.  
The “person reasonably skilled in the art” standard allows third parties 
to better predict when they will infringe on prior art and encourages 
technological growth and innovation by reassuring competitors they will 
not be sued for infringement. 
The clarity provided by using the new standard will also ensure that 
the public and others skilled in the art receive adequate notice of what is 
included in the prior art.  Notice was meant to be one of the primary 
functions of patents, aside from protecting inventors’ intellectual 
property rights.103  If third parties can better discern the boundaries of a 
patentee’s rights, they will also be on notice as to what information is off 
limits and what information is already protected and/or owned by 
competition . . . .”). 
99. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1215  n.225 (“‘There can be no denying that 
the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-
notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.’”) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 
U.S. at 29). 
100. See Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1212-13 (describing ways in which the doctrine of 
equivalents makes patent scope less predictable than a simple reading of the claims). 
101. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (“a patentee may invoke [the doctrine of 
equivalents] . . . ‘if [the device] performs substantially the same function in substantially the 
same way to obtain the same result’”) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 
30, 42 (1929)). 
102. See supra note 99. 
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .”).  See also supra note 100. 
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another.  This should avoid unnecessary infringement suits while 
promoting innovation, as inventors should be better able to determine 
the limits of prior art. 
Finally, the clarity provided by the “person reasonably skilled in the 
art” standard will benefit everyone involved in the practice of patent 
law by creating greater consistency in court opinions.  When courts 
follow a standard that is more reliable and easier to define, such as 
Phillips’s person of ordinary skill in the art standard, they can create a 
consistent body of law.  Not only is it easier to follow a consistent body 
of law than an inconsistent one, but also it is easier for interested parties 
to predict the outcome of cases that come before the courts in the 
future. 
C.  Other Options Available to Patentees for Broadening Claims 
Abandonment of the doctrine of equivalents would not eliminate all 
options for those inventors whose claims were effectively infringed by a 
similar invention.  Reissue proceedings could offer an alternative to 
doctrine of equivalents protection.104  Under a reissue proceeding, the 
patentee may seek retroactive protection for certain aspects of his 
invention not claimed in the original patent.105  Effectively, reissue 
proceedings can broaden a patent’s claims in a way similar to the 
doctrine of equivalents, except the proceeding is codified in statute and 
is statutorily restricted.106  The reissue proceeding would not broaden a 
patent’s claims to the same extent as the doctrine of equivalents, and it 
would not allow for inclusion of after-arising technologies into the scope 
of the patent, thus eliminating some of the major issues with the 
doctrine of equivalents.107  Perhaps if American courts abandon the 
104. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).  Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1955 (“We begin by 
embracing the reissue proceeding as an alternative to the [doctrine of equivalents].”).  
Meurer & Nard favor the reissue proceeding and discuss its advantages at length, calling it 
“an under-utilized proceeding that has many of the advantages of the [doctrine of 
equivalents] with relatively few of its drawbacks.”  Id.  See also Richards et al., supra note 13, 
at 740-45 (discussing ways in which the reissue proceeding can be improved to make it a 
better alternative to prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents). 
105. 35 U.S.C. § 251. 
106. Id. 
107. Id.  See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1995 (“[R]eissue ‘adequately 
protects patentees from “fraud,” “piracy,” and “stealing,”’ [while] ‘also protect[ing] 
businessmen from retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a monopoly sphere 
beyond that which a patent expressly authorizes.’”) (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615 
(Black, J., dissenting)). 
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doctrine of equivalents, reissue proceedings will become more common 
and will offer further protection for patentees’ rights.108
D.  Many Still Favor the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Many believe that by eliminating the doctrine of equivalents, courts 
will no longer provide adequate rights to patentees who receive 
narrower patent scope.109  Perhaps though, patent claims should not 
receive the scope they do under doctrine of equivalents law.  Perhaps by 
broadening the patentees’ rights to such a large extent, courts have 
begun to infringe the rights of third parties who cannot predict when 
their own inventions will infringe prior art and who may therefore 
refrain from investing in innovation in the first place. 
Some may also doubt whether this new standard will actually 
provide more objectivity in practice than when courts tried to apply the 
doctrine of equivalents.110  When courts apply any standard, no matter 
how straightforward the standard may be, there is some variation as to 
how the standard will be interpreted and applied.  Despite this 
unavoidable fact, the “person of ordinary skill in the art” standard will 
provide more predictability for both patentees and third parties because 
the patent claims would be read and interpreted from their perspective 
as experts in the field.111  Inventors will no longer need to try to 
determine which source the courts will use in interpreting their claims, 
which canon of construction they will favor, or whether they will adopt 
the holistic approach or the procedural approach to claims 
interpretation.  Instead, inventors may simply use language with which 
they are familiar, both in drafting their own patent claims and in 
interpreting the claims of others.  Patentees can better predict that 
courts will interpret the claims in accordance with their intentions, and 
108. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1955 (“Reissue . . . is an under-utilized 
proceeding that has many of the advantages of the [doctrine of equivalents] with relatively 
few of its drawbacks.”). 
109. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 41, at 1659 (“[R]estricting the patent to the subject 
matter literally contained within the claims can turn a patent into ‘a hollow and useless 
thing.’”) (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607).  The courts have also repeatedly upheld the 
doctrine, despite the controversy that has surrounded it since its inception.  R. CARL MOY, 
MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 13:33 (2007) (providing background and history surrounding 
the court’s decision in Festo). 
110. See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1112-13 (stating that the 
procedural approach to claim interpretation is more objective). 
111. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (“The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the 
art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim 
interpretation.”). 
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competing inventors can better predict that courts will interpret the 
claims in the same way they would interpret them.  In this way, the 
standard will provide more consistency in court opinions and better 
notice to interested parties. 
Some have also argued there is a social benefit gained from the 
doctrine of equivalents because it lessens the cost associated with 
refining patent claims.112  This benefit applies to all inventors who apply 
for patent protection, but it impacts inventors of “pioneer inventions” 
most heavily.113  Pioneer inventions provide the foundation from which 
many other inventors build and expand on the original ideas embodied 
in them.  Some claim that without the doctrine of equivalents, inventors 
of pioneer inventions would need to invest too much of their resources 
into refining patent claims in order to prevent equivalent products from 
effectively stripping them of their patent rights.114  Without extensive 
refinement, it would be too easy for others to develop a product very 
similar to, but still slightly different from, the original invention.  The 
slight improvements in the later technology could render the pioneer 
invention obsolete, and without patent protection, pioneer inventors 
would have no way of protecting themselves against such equivalent 
products. 
The doctrine of equivalents may provide this benefit in the limited 
instances of pioneer inventions, but, as stated above, the “person of 
ordinary skill in the art” standard should make the process of drafting 
claims more straightforward for the patentee.  Inventors could rely on 
their expertise in drafting claims and could be more certain that their 
intentions would be honored by the courts.  In addition, as stated above, 
there may be recourse for pioneer inventors in reissue proceedings as 
they refine and develop their new technologies.  Further, granting 
patent rights in after-arising technologies may actually discourage 
competitors from entering the market and improving on prior art in the 
first place.115  In this way, competition would benefit if there were no 
doctrine of equivalents.116
112. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1955-56 (stating that the doctrine of 
equivalents is socially beneficial when applied to new technologies). 
113. Id. at 1989 (“Pioneer inventions should enjoy a presumption in favor of applying 
the [doctrine of equivalents].”). 
114. See id. 
115. See id.  See also supra notes 41, 53, and 57. 
116. Sarnoff, supra note 12, at 1171. 
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There is also the fear that this rule could lead to an increase in the 
costs of patent prosecution.117  This rule should actually make patent 
prosecution easier for patentees because it will ensure that claims are 
interpreted according to the inventor’s intentions and using the 
definitions most familiar to those skilled in the art.  This means 
inventors could more easily draft claims that adequately express their 
ideas and could rely on the courts to interpret the claim in the way they 
intended them to be interpreted. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of equivalents arose out of a desire to treat patentees 
fairly when courts construed claim language literally and narrowly, or 
where extrinsic interpretive devices failed to capture adequately the 
patentee’s intentions when he drafted the patent claims.118  As U.S. 
courts move away from procedural claim interpretation using extrinsic 
sources and toward the holistic approach, which places greater emphasis 
on intrinsic sources, the doctrine of equivalents will become 
unnecessary.  Holistic claim interpretation, in conjunction with an 
interpretive method that places emphasis on the knowledge and 
expertise of those persons reasonably skilled in the relevant art, will 
ensure that patentees receive property rights consistent with their 
intentions in drafting the claims, will provide adequate notice to third 
parties, and will provide better consistency in court opinions 
interpreting patent claims.  The new standard eliminates many of the 
costs to society created by extending patent claims through the doctrine 
of equivalents, while at the same time remedying those costs and 
providing its own benefits to the area of patent law. 
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117. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 14, at 1970 (stating that without the doctrine of 
equivalents, patent prosecutors will have to be able to foresee more after-arising technologies 
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